Abstract. In a recent paper Dinur and Nissim considered a statistical database in which a trusted database administrator monitors queries and introduces noise to the responses with the goal of maintaining data privacy [5] . Under a rigorous definition of breach of privacy, Dinur and Nissim proved that unless the total number of queries is sub-linear in the size of the database, a substantial amount of noise is required to avoid a breach, rendering the database almost useless. As databases grow increasingly large, the possibility of being able to query only a sub-linear number of times becomes realistic. We further investigate this situation, generalizing the previous work in two important directions: multi-attribute databases (previous work dealt only with single-attribute databases) and vertically partitioned databases, in which different subsets of attributes are stored in different databases. In addition, we show how to use our techniques for datamining on published noisy statistics.
Introduction
In a recent paper Dinur and Nissim considered a statistical database in which a trusted database administrator monitors queries and introduces noise to the responses with the goal of maintaining data privacy [5] . Under a rigorous definition of breach of privacy, Dinur and Nissim proved that unless the total number of queries is sub-linear in the size of the database, a substantial amount of noise is required to avoid a breach, rendering the database almost useless 1 . However, when the number of queries is limited, it is possible to simultaneously preserve privacy and obtain some functionality by adding an amount of noise that is a function of the number of queries. Intuitively, the amount of noise is sufficiently large that nothing specific about an individual can be learned from a relatively small number of queries, but not so large that information about sufficiently strong statistical trends is obliterated.
As databases grow increasingly massive, the notion that the database will be queried only a sub-linear number of times becomes realistic. We further investigate this situation, significantly broadening the results in [5] , as we describe below.
Methodology. We follow a cryptography-flavored methodology, where we consider a database access mechanism private only if it provably withstands any adversarial attack. For such a database access mechanism any computation over query answers clearly preserves privacy (otherwise it would serve as a privacy breaching adversary). We present a database access mechanism and prove its security under a strong privacy definition. Then we show that this mechanism provides utility by demonstrating a datamining algorithm.
Statistical Databases.
A statistical database is a collection of samples that are somehow representative of an underlying population distribution. We model a database as a matrix, in which rows correspond to individual records and columns correspond to attributes. A query to the database is a set of indices (specifying rows), and a Boolean property. The response is a noisy version of the number of records in the specified set for which the property holds. (Dinur and Nissim consider one-column databases containing a single binary attribute.) The model captures the situation of a traditional, multiple-attribute, database, in which an adversary knows enough partial information about records to "name" some records or select among them. Such an adversary can target a selected record in order to try to learn the value of one of its unknown sensitive attributes. Thus, the mapping of individuals to their indices (record numbers) is not assumed to be secret. For example, we do not assume the records have been randomly permuted.
We assume each row is independently sampled from some underlying distribution. An analyst would usually assume the existence of a single underlying row distribution D, and try to learn its properties.
Privacy. Our notion of privacy is a relative one. We assume the adversary knows the underlying distribution D on the data, and, furthermore, may have some a priori information about specific records, e.g., "p -the a priori probability that at least one of the attributes in record 400 has value 1 -is .38". We anlyze privacy with respect to any possible underlying (row) distributions {D i }, where the ith row is chosen according to D i . This partially models a priori knowledge an attacker has about individual rows (i.e. D i is D conditioned on the attacker's knowledge of the ith record). Continuing with our informal example, privacy is breached if the a posteriori probability (after the sequence of queries have been issued and responded to) that "at least one of the attributes in record 400 has value 1" differs from the a priori probability p "too much".
Multi-Attribute Sub-Linear Queries (SuLQ) Databases. The setting studied in [5] , in which an adversary issues only a sublinear number of queries (SuLQ) to a single attribute database, can be generalized to multiple attributes in several natural ways. The simplest scenario is of a single k-attribute SuLQ database, queried by specifying a set of indices and a k-ary Boolean function. The response is a noisy version of the number of records in the specified set for which the function, applied to the attributes in the record, evaluates to 1. A more involved scenario is of multiple single-attribute SuLQ databases, one for each attribute, administered independently. In other words, our k-attribute database is vertically partitioned into k single-attribute databases. In this case, the challenge will be datamining: learning the statistics of Boolean functions of the attributes, using the single-attribute query and response mechanisms as primitives. A third possibility is a combination of the first two: a k-attribute database that is vertically partitioned into two (or more) databases with k 1 and k 2 (possibly overlapping) attributes, respectively, where
handle k i -ary functional queries, and the goal is to learn relationships between the functional outputs, eg, "If f 1 (α 1,1 , . . . , α 1,k 1 ) holds, does this increase the likelihood that f 2 (α 2,1 . . . , α 2,k 2 ) holds?", where f i is a function on the attribute values for records in the ith database.
Our Results
We obtain positive datamining results in the extensions to the model of [5] described above, while maintaining the strengthened privacy requirement: Since the published data are the results of SuLQ database queries, the total number of published statistics must be sublinear in n, the size of the database. Also, in order to keep the error down, several queries must be made for each conjunction of literals. These two facts constrain the values of and the total number k of attributes for which the result is meaningful.
Related Work
There is a rich literature on confidentiality in statistical databases. An excellent survey of work prior to the late 1980's was made by Adam and Wortmann [2] . Using their taxonomy, our work falls under the category of output perturbation. However, to our knowledge, the only work that has exploited the opportunities for privacy inherent in the fact that with massive of databases the actual number of queries will be sublinear is Sect. 4 of [5] (joint work with Dwork). That work only considered single-attribute SuLQ databases. Fanconi and Merola give a more recent survey, with a focus on aggregated data released via web access [10] . Evfimievski, Gehrke, and Srikant, in the Introduction to [7] , give a very nice discussion of work in randomization of data, in which data contributors (e.g., respondents to a survey) independently add noise to their own responses. A special issue (Vol.14, No. 4, 1998) of the Journal of Official Statistics is dedicated to disclosure control in statistical data. A discussion of some of the trends in the statistical research, accessible to the non-statistician, can be found in [8] .
Many papers in the statistics literature deal with generating simulated data while maintaining certain quantities, such as marginals [9] . Other widely-studied techniques include cell suppression, adding simulated data, releasing only a subset of observations, releasing only a subset of attributes, releasing synthetic or partially synthetic data [13, 12] , data-swapping, and post-randomization. See Duncan (2001) [6] .
R. Agrawal and Srikant began to address privacy in datamining in 2000 [3] . That work attempted to formalize privacy in terms of confidence intervals (intuitively, a small interval of confidence corresponds to a privacy breach), and also showed how to reconstruct an original distribution from noisy samples (i.e., each sample is the sum of an underlying data distribution sample and a noise sample), where the noise is drawn from a certain simple known distribution. This work was revisited by D. Agrawal and C. Aggarwal [1] , who noted that it is possible to use the outcome of the distribution reconstruction procedure to significantly diminish the interval of confidence, and hence breach privacy. They formulated privacy (loss) in terms of mutual information, taking into account (unlike [3] ) that the adversary may know the underlying distribution on the data and "facts of life" (for example, that ages cannot be negative). Intuitively, if the mutual information between the sensitive data and its noisy version is high, then a privacy breach occurs. They also considered reconstruction from noisy samples, using the EM (expectation maximization) technique. Evfimievsky, Gehrke, and Srikant [7] criticized the usage of mutual information for measuring privacy, noting that low mutual information allows complete privacy breaches that happen with low but significant frequency. Concurrently with and independently of Dinur and Nissim [5] they presented a privacy definition that related the a priori and a posteriori knowledge of sensitive data. We note below how our definition of privacy breach relates to that of [7, 5] .
A different and appealing definition has been proposed by Chawla, Dwork, McSherry, Smith, and Wee [4] , formalizing the intuition that one's privacy is guaranteed to the extent that one is not brought to the attention of others. We do not yet understand the relationship between the definition in [4] and the one presented here.
There is also a very large literature in secure multi-party computation. In secure multi-party computation, functionality is paramount, and privacy is only preserved to the extent that the function outcome itself does not reveal information about the individual inputs. In privacy-preserving statistical databases, privacy is paramount. Functions of the data that cannot be learned while protecting privacy will simply not be learned.
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by neg(n) (read: negligible) a function that is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial. That is, for all c > 0, for all sufficiently large n, we have neg(n) < 1/n c . We writeÕ(T (n)) for T (n) · polylog(n).
The Database Model
In the following discussion, we do not distinguish between the case of a vertically partitioned database (in which the columns are distributed among several servers) and a "whole" database (in which all the information is in one place). We model a database as an n × k binary matrix d = {d i,j }. Intuitively, the columns in d correspond to Boolean attributes α 1 , . . . , α k , and the rows in d correspond to individuals where d i,j = 1 iff attribute α j holds for individual i. We sometimes refer to a row as a record.
Let D be a distribution on {0, 1} k . We say that a database d = {d i,j } is chosen according to distribution D if every row in d is chosen according to D, independently of the other rows (in other words, d is chosen according to D n ).
In our privacy analysis we relax this requirement and allow each row i to be chosen from a (possibly) different distribution D i . In that case we say that the database is chosen according to
Statistical Queries. A statistical query is a pair (q, g), where q ⊆ [n] indicates a set of rows in d and g : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} denotes a function on attribute values. The exact answer to (q, g) is the number of rows of d in the set q for which g holds (evaluates to 1): and g(d i,1 , . . . , d i,k ) holds}|.
We write (q, j) when the function g is a projection onto the jth element:
In that case (q, j) is a query on a subset of the entries in the jth column: a q,j = i∈q d i,j . When we look at vertically partitioned singleattribute databases, the queries will all be of this form.
Perturbation. We allow the database algorithm to give perturbed (or "noisy") answers to queries. We say that an answerâ q,j is within perturbation E if |â q,j − a q,j | ≤ E. Similarly, a database algorithm A is within perturbation E if for every query (q, g)
The probability is taken over the randomness of the database algorithm A. 
Probability
z | + tβ the proposition follows.
Privacy Definition
We give a privacy definition that extends the definitions in [5, 7] . Our definition is inspired by the notion of semantic security of Goldwasser and Micali [11] . We first state the formal definition and then show some of its consequences. Let p i,j 0 be the a priori probability that d i,j = 1 (taking into account that we assume the adversary knows the underlying distribution D i on row i. In general, for a Boolean function f : {0, 1}
k → {0, 1} we let p i,f 0 be the a priori probability that f (d i,1 , . . . , d i,k ) = 1. We analyze the a posteriori probability that f (d i,1 , . . . , d i,k ) 
Confidence. To simplify our calculations we follow [5] and define a monotonicallyincreasing 1-1 mapping conf : (0, 1) → IR as follows:
Note that a small additive change in conf implies a small additive change in p. 4 Let conf
and conf
. We write our privacy requirements in terms of the random variables ∆conf i,f defined as: 
Definition 1 ((δ, T )-Privacy
i,f > δ] ≤ neg(n).
The probability is taken over the choice of each row in d according to D, and the randomness of the adversary as well as the database access mechanism.
A target set F is a set of k-ary Boolean functions (one can think of the functions in F as being selected by an adversary; these represent information it will try to learn about someone). A target set F is δ-safe if ∆conf i,f ≤ δ for all i ∈ [n] and f ∈ F . Let F be a target set. Definition 1 implies that under a (δ, T )-private database mechanism, F is δ-safe with probability 1 − neg(n).
Proposition 2. Consider a (δ, T )-private database with k = O(log n) attributes. Let F be the target set containing all the 2 2 k Boolean functions over the k attributes. Then, Pr[F is 2δ-safe] = 1 − neg(n).
Proof. Let F be a target set containing all 2 k conjuncts of k attributes. We have that |F | = poly(n) and hence F is δ-safe with probability 1 − neg(n).
To prove the proposition we show that F is safe whenever F is. Let f ∈ F be a Boolean function. Express f as a disjunction of conjuncts of k attributes:
Similarly, express ¬f as the disjunction of the remaining 2 k − conjuncts:
We have: Relationship to the privacy definition of [7] Our privacy definition extends the definition of p 0 -to-p 1 privacy breaches of [7] . Their definition is introduced with respect to a scenario in which several users send their sensitive data to a center. Each user randomizes his data prior to sending it. A p 0 -to-p 1 privacy breach occurs if, with respect to some property f , the a priori probability that f holds for a user is at most p 0 whereas the a posteriori probability may grow beyond p 1 (i.e. in a worst case scenario with respect to the coins of the randomization operator).
Privacy of Multi-Attribute SuLQ databases
We first describe our SuLQ Database algorithm, and then prove that it preserves privacy. Let T (n) = O(n c ), c < 1, and define R = T (n)/δ 2 · log µ n for some µ > 0 (taking µ = 6 will work). To simplify notation, we write
SuLQ Database Algorithm A Input: a query (q, g).
Generate a perturbation value: Let
Note that E is a binomial random variable with E[E] = 0 and standard deviation √ R. In our analysis we will neglect the case where E largely deviates from zero, as the probability of such an event is extremely small: Pr[|E| > √ R log 2 n] = neg(n). In particular, this implies that our SuLQ database algorithm A is withiñ O( T (n)) perturbation.
We will use the following proposition. 
E[L] = O(1/R), where the expectation is taken over the random choice of B.
Proof. 
2. Using the symmetry of the Binomial distribution we get:
Our proof of privacy is modeled on the proof in Section 4 of [5] (for single attribute databases). We extend their proof (i) to queries of the form (q, g) where g is any k-ary Boolean function, and (ii) to privacy of k-ary Boolean functions f .
Note that whenever T (n)/δ < √ n bounding the adversary's number of queries to T (n) allows privacy with perturbation magnitude less than √ n.
Proof. Let T (n) be as in the theorem and recall R = T (n)/δ 2 · log µ n for some µ > 0.
Let the T = T (n) queries issued by the adversary be denoted ( 0 . By the definition of conditional probability 6 we get
Note that the probabilities are taken over the coin flips of the SuLQ algorithm and the choice of d. In the following we analyze the numerator (the denominator is analyzed similarly).
The last equality follows as the rows in d are chosen independently of each other. Note that given both d i and d {−i} the random variableâ is independent ofâ 1 , . . . ,â −1 . Hence, we get:
Next, we observe that althoughâ depends on d i , the dependence is weak. More formally, let σ 0 , σ 1 ∈ {0, 1} k be such that f (σ 0 ) = 0 and f (σ 1 ) = 1. Note that whenever
and E is noise that yieldsâ when
Note that the value of does not depend on σ. Taking into account both cases (g (σ) = g (σ 1 ) and g (σ) = g (σ 1 )) we get
Letγ be the probability, over d i , that g(σ) = g(σ 1 ). Letting γ ≥ 1 be such that 2 1/γ =γ, we have
and similarly
Putting the pieces together we get that conf = log 2 Num
.
Define a random walk on the real line with step = conf − conf −1 . To conclude the proof we show that (with high probability) T steps of the random walk do not suffice to reach distance δ. From Proposition 3 and Lemma 1 we get that
Using Proposition 1 with λ = log n we get that for all t ≤ T ,
Datamining on Vertically Partitioned Databases
In this section we assume that the database is chosen according to D n for some underlying distribution D on rows, where D is independent of n, the size of the database. We also assume that n, is sufficiently large that the true database statistics are representative of D. Hence, in the sequel, when we write things like "Pr[α]" we mean the probability, over the entries in the database, that α holds.
Let α and β be attributes. We say that α implies β in probability if the conditional probability of β given α exceeds the unconditional probability of β. The ability to measure implication in probability is crucial to datamining. Our key result for vertically partitioned databases is a method, given two single-attribute SuLQ databases with attributes α and β respectively, to measure Pr [β|α] .
For more general cases of vertically partitioned data, assume a k-attribute database is partitioned into 2 ≤ j ≤ k databases, with k 1 , . . . , k j (possibly overlapping) attributes, respectively, where i k i ≥ k. We can use functional queries to learn the statistics on k i -ary Boolean functions of the attributes in the ith database, and then use the results for two single-attribute SuLQ databases to learn binary Boolean functions of any two functions f i1 (on attributes in database i 1 ) and f i 2 (on attributes in database i 2 ), where 1 ≤ i 1 , i 2 ≤ j.
Probabilistic Implication
In this section we construct our basic building block for mining vertically partitioned databases.
We assume two (1 − p a ) .
Let
Note that
and hence (by another application of Eq. (1))
We define the following testing procedure to determine, given
Step 1 finds a heavy (but not very heavy) set for attribute α, that is, a set q for which the number of records satisfying α exceeds the expected number by more than a standard deviation. Note that since T (n) = o(n), the noise |â q,1 − a q,1 | is o( √ n), so the heavy set really has N p α + Ω( √ N ) records for which α holds.
Step 2 queries d 2 on this heavy set. If the incidence of β on this set sufficiently (as a function of ∆ 1 ) exceeds the expected incidence of β, then the test returns "1" (ie, success). Otherwise it returns 0.
Theorem 2. For the test procedure T :
In the following analysis we neglect the difference between a q,i andâ q,i , since, as noted above, the perturbation contributes only low order terms (we neglect some other low order terms). Note that it is possible to compute all the required constants for Theorem 2 explicitly, in polynomial time, without neglecting these low-order terms. Our analysis does not attempt to optimize constants.
Proof. Consider the random variable corresponding to a q,2 = i∈q d i,2 , given that q is biased according to Step 1 of T . By linearity of expectation, together with the fact that the two cases below are disjoint, we get that To get the second part of the claim we use the de Moivre-Laplace theorem and approximate the binomial distribution with the normal distribution so that we can approximate the variance of the sum of two distributions (when α holds and when α does not hold) in order to obtain the variance of a q,2 conditioned on bias α . We get: We have that the probability distribution on a q,2 is a Gaussian with mean and variance at most N p β + bias α (∆ 1 − ε)/(1 − p α ) and Var β respectively. To conclude the proof, we note that the conditional probability mass of a q,2 exceeding its own mean by ε · bias α /(1 − p α ) > εσ α /(1 − p α ) is at most
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution. 
Datamining on Published Statistics
In this section we apply our basic technique for measuring implication in probability to the real-life model in which confidential information is gathered by 
